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1. INTRODUCTION  
Over the years a consensus has emerged in development policy that, while further 
improving the conditions for economic growth, an increasing focus should be put on 
poverty reduction. This consensus culminated in the UN Millennium Declaration, signed 
in September 2000 by 189 governments, committing themselves to reduce extreme 
poverty in all its key dimensions by 2015. The eight Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) that derive from this Declaration provide an agenda for global action1. Their 
achievement has also become a key objective for the European Union as confirmed by 
the April 2004 General Affairs Council.  
In March 2002, the international community agreed on a comprehensive agenda for 
action by adopting the so-called Monterrey Consensus at the International Conference on 
Financing for Development (FfD). The EU contributed significantly to the overall 
positive outcome of the Conference by acting collectively at Monterrey, on the basis of 
explicit commitments concerning both the volume and the quality of aid, endorsed by the 
European Council in Barcelona on 14 March 2002 (see Box 1 below). 
The most visible outcome of the FfD Conference was in terms of increased donor 
commitments in Official Development Assistance (ODA2), estimated at about an extra 
US$15 billion a year as of 2006. These efforts however still fell short of the financing 
gap deemed necessary to meet the MDGs, estimated at the time at some additional 
US$50 billion a year. Latest cost estimates by the UN Millennium Project3, led by Jeffrey 
Sachs, give a somewhat higher financing gap. 
Box 1: The Barcelona Commitments 
• Increase EU ODA to 0.39% of GNI, by 2006 and to examine the means and 
timeframe for each EU Member State to reach the UN 0.7% ODA goal. The 
intermediate ODA target consists of an individual and a collective angle: Member 
States commit to individually reach a baseline target of at least 0.33% ODA/GNI so 
that the EU collectively can achieve the collective 0.39% goal. 
• Improve aid effectiveness through closer coordination of policies and harmonisation 
of procedures, and take concrete steps to this effect before 2004. 
• Take measures with regard to untying of aid to Least Developed Countries. 
• Increase Trade-Related Assistance. 
• Support the identification of relevant Global Public Goods. 
• Explore innovative sources of financing. 
• Support the reforms of the International Financial Systems and strengthen the voice of 
developing countries in international economic decision-making. 
                                                 
1 The eight MDGs are: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; 
promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; 
combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; develop a 
Global Partnership for Development. 
2 ODA is the formal term for aid, defined by the OECD/DAC as the sum of grants and concessional 
loans (i.e. with a grant element of at least 25%) undertaken by the official sector. 
3 See http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/  
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• Pursue the efforts to restore debt sustainability in the context of the enhanced HIPC 
initiative. 
Following a Council mandate, the Commission prepares annual monitoring reports on the 
implementation of the “Barcelona commitments”4 
In September 2005, the UN General Assembly will take stock of the progress made by 
UN Members in the implementation of this global agenda at the MDG High Level Event. 
The General Assembly will prepare this High Level Event through the High Level 
Dialogue on Financing for Development (27-28 June 2005). In preparation for these 
events, various initiatives have been developed with the aim of estimating the financing 
resources needed to reach the MDGs, as well as identifying the modalities through which 
such resources could be mobilised.  
A number of reports have also been issued in the recent months to analyse the various 
proposals on ways to increase financing for development, such as: the joint IMF/World 
Bank paper “Aid effectiveness and financing modalities” prepared for the 2004 Annual 
Meetings; the Quadripartite Report (sponsored by the Presidents of Brazil, Chile, France 
and Spain) and presented in New York by President Lula in September 2004; the Landau 
Report, commissioned by President Chirac and also submitted in September 2004. 
Finally, in March 2005 the UK-sponsored Commission for Africa issued its report, 
specifying a comprehensive package of actions needed for the continent. 
This Staff Working Paper takes up the invitation of the ECOFIN Council5, while also 
attempting to provide input to follow-up to the GAERC Conclusions6. By bringing 
together work carried out in the different Commission Services concerned, this paper 
aims to inform the debate among EU ministers with a view to a possible EU position for 
the 2005 UN High Level Event on innovative ways of financing. In this context, in order 
to contribute to the international debate, the Commission services are preparing a 
Communication on financing for development and aid effectiveness.  
The paper builds upon the Commission 2002 Globalisation Report7, which already 
contained an assessment of various options for innovative sources of financing, and 
updates the debate with the most recent ones. The various proposals made on the 
voluntary mechanisms which range from an international lottery to opt-out levies are 
beyond the scope of this paper. A number of criteria could be considered when assessing 
the options: revenue-raising capacity; stability and predictability of resources raised; 
degree of additionality achieved; economic impact (both at micro-economic and macro-
economic level); practical feasibility, e.g. legal and institutional constraints, taking into 
account timing and whether global participation is a necessary condition. 
                                                 
4 SEC (2003) 569, 15.05.2003; COM (2004) 150 final of 05.03.2004. 
5 As reported in document SI(2005)29 “Le Président JUNCKER a conclu que le Conseil ECOFIN 
du mois d’avril examinera les questions de relatif court terme (allègement de la dette, […]) sur la 
base de contributions du Comité économique et financier et de la Commission; les questions et 
actions à plus long terme (notamment la possibilité de financement innovants) […] feront l’objet 
d’une discussion lors de la réunion informelle des Ministres des finances au cours du mois de 
mai” 
6 The November 2004 GAERC concluded that “The EU will also explore innovative ways of 
financing based upon proposals submitted by the Commission with a view to the 2005 High Level 
Event.” 
7 CEC “Responses to the Challenges of Globalisation” SEC(2002)185. 
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Clearly, no single proposal would meet all criteria simultaneously. The paper therefore 
takes the stance to omit some of them and select those that: (i) have a revenue-raising 
potential appropriate to the needs linked to the MDGs; (ii) do not need global consensus 
and hence can be implemented at the regional (EU) level, bearing in mind the need to 
ensure a proper burden-sharing at the global scale; (iii) offer reasonable prospects for 
rapid implementation; (iv) yield predictable and stable resources; and (v) avoid major 
economic distortions. 
The paper first reviews the option of increasing ODA by increasing the share of national 
budgets devoted to development (section 2). It then examines the UK Government’s 
proposal for an International Finance Facility (section 3), and a range of proposals for 
taxation to yield additional resources (section 4). Section 5 considers the recent proposals 
for further debt relief. Given that discussion of innovative sources of finance would be 
incomplete without considering the ways in which such resources might be most 
effectively deployed, section 6 reviews ways to increase aid effectiveness. Section 7 
provides concluding remarks. 
2. ACTING ON AID BUDGETS  
Global ODA flows8 from OECD/DAC members to developing countries reached in 2003 
US$ 69 billion; of these, nearly 54% were provided by the EU (of which 19% managed 
by the European Commission). This represents an increase in real terms from 2002 levels 
of nearly 5%. In terms of GNI, the EU-15 countries together provided in 2003 an effort 
of 0.35% of ODA, against a DAC average of 0.25%. Large differences are visible though 
among DAC members (see Chart 1). 
Recent years have seen a reversal in the negative ODA trend recorded in the 1990s, when 
ODA as a percentage of GNI decreased from 0.33% in 1990 to 0.22% in 2000. The FfD 
Conference of 2002 has certainly helped revitalise ODA flows, but these are still far 
away from the recommended aid target of 0.7%. Moreover, the recent surge in ODA 
mostly derived from debt relief operations, as well as from Iraq and Afghanistan 
reconstruction. Therefore there are still reasons to expect donors to act on aid budgets. 
A direct, simple and efficient way to increase the flow of development aid is to increase 
the resources allocated to aid in national budgets9. Aid budgets are devoted to activities 
that support countries to reach the MDGs, and they are subject to the normal processes of 
democratic debate and scrutiny that ensure transparency and accountability. Additionality 
can thus be monitored. 
While increasing national aid budgets may be simple in terms of technical 
implementation, this is less so in terms of political decision-making. Like any other form 
of additional public spending on development aid, this involves a shift in relative 
budgetary priorities from domestic to external ones. Since a considerable number of EU 
Member States are in a phase of fiscal consolidation to reduce excessive deficits, this can 
be a politically difficult process. The report by the ECOFIN Council of 20 March 2005 
on improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact has agreed on a way 
                                                 
8 Source: OECD DDC/DAC “2004 Development co-operation Report”, January 2005. 
9 The World Bank staff paper for the 2004 Development Committee said that “the simplest 
approach to ensuring that more aid is available where it is needed would be for donor countries to 
increase their aid budgets”. 
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to deal with the possible tension between the requirements of the Pact and ODA. It 
provides that - when taking into account “all other relevant factors” in the Commission’s 
report under Article 104(3) - “special consideration will be given to budgetary efforts 
towards increasing or maintaining at a high level financial contributions to fostering 
international solidarity and to achieving European policy goals, …”. While ODA is likely 
to be considered as a contribution to international solidarity, this rule will only apply to a 
deficit which is temporarily above, but close to the reference value. 
Chart 1: Net ODA in EU Member States and other OECD countries in % of Gross 
National Income (GNI) in 2003 
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Source: OECD/DAC Annual Report 2004 and replies of EU Member States  
to the Monterrey questionnaire 
In terms of the ODA/GNI ratio the Barcelona commitment foresees an individual 
baseline target of 0.33% for each Member State that contributes to achieve the collective 
EU target of 0.39% by 2006. If commitments by Member States are confirmed over time, 
the EU-25 would collectively reach an ODA level of 0.42% of GNI in 2006 - 
representing a potential allocation of €46.5 billion p.a.. Eight Member States have either 
achieved or pledged to achieve the UN goal of 0.7 % ODA/ GNI.  
The European Council of December 2004 confirmed the EU’s commitment to the MDGs 
and mandated the Commission to present to the Council “concrete proposals on setting 
new and adequate ODA targets for the period 2009-2010, while taking into account the 
position of the new Member States”. In this context, draft proposals are currently under 
preparation for a new intermediate target for 2010, with a view to meeting the target of 
0.7% in 2015; the proposals will be submitted for possible adoption by the Commission 
in April.  
3. FRONTLOADING THE MONTERREY COMMITMENTS 
Commitments made at the Monterrey FfD Conference of additional aid per year may 
amount to around US$ 15 billion as of 2006 (some of which are already materialising or 
even being surpassed), which can be expected to grow over time. However, the rate at 
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which these extra commitments are made available may be too slow in comparison with 
the pressing needs in order to attain the MDGs in due time. 
The International Financial Facility (IFF), a proposal put forward by the UK Government 
in January 2003, has to be seen in this context. It is designed as a temporary facility to 
frontload the commitments made in Monterrey by issuing bonds in international capital 
markets, backed by binding commitments of donors to provide regular payments to the 
facility. It is not designed to provide additional resources on top of those already 
committed in 2002. Hence it would only temporarily contribute to filling the financing 
gap identified in section 1. 
So far, the working hypothesis is that the lifespan of the IFF would be of 30 years, 15 
devoted to disbursing to developing countries, and the last 15 years only for repaying 
bondholders10. As a result, the frontloading implies an increase of aid flows up to 2015, 
and a subsequent nominal decrease as donors’ payments to the facility are used to 
reimburse IFF bondholders (see Chart 2). 
Chart 2: International Finance Facility income and disbursements – scenario of a 30-
year life-time 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
20
16
20
18
20
20
20
22
20
24
20
26
20
28
20
30
20
32
20
34
U
S
$
 b
il
li
o
n
IFFdisbursements IFF income
 
Source: UK HM Treasury 
It is worth noting that in the recent months a pilot IFF scheme for immunisation has been 
developed in more detail for supporting GAVI (Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization). Its launch, when it occurs, should help clarify some of the open questions 
about the IFF.  
Several issues are at stake to assess the desirability and feasibility of the IFF proposal, 
which can be treated in four categories: (i) the rationale of frontloading; (ii) the recording 
in the national accounts of donors; (iii) institutional and governance issues; (iv) the 
financial structure. 
                                                 
10 See HM UK Treasury ‘International Finance Facility- technical issues note’ issued in March 
2003. The possibility of other scenarios would of course not be precluded in further discussions. 
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(i) The rationale of frontloading 
From the recipient countries’ perspective, the main justification for frontloading aid 
stems from the urgency of providing stable and predictable resources now rather than 
later, in order to accelerate progress towards the MDGs which seems unattainable under 
current trends of financing. From the donor countries’ perspective, and in analogy to a 
private investment project with a positive net present value, the intertemporal shift of 
ODA through the capital market would be an efficient solution if frontloaded public 
investment triggered a self-sustaining development process. This would both generate 
faster poverty reduction and allow ODA savings in the future. In technical terms, a rate 
of return on development programmes which is higher than both the borrowing cost 
(estimated around 5-6% for the IFF bonds, assuming an AAA rating) and the social “time 
preference rate” (estimated at 5-8% for low-income countries) would ensure efficiency. 
However, this potential benefit could in principle also be achieved if each donor 
borrowed directly on the capital market. The advantages of the ‘common pool approach’ 
of the IFF therefore have to be found elsewhere, according to the UK proposal in terms 
of greater co-ordination and harmonisation, hence greater aid effectiveness; in terms of 
better market conditions for refinancing due to pooled risks; or in terms of locking in 
donor pledges for a longer term. This would require a certain critical mass of donors 
participating in the IFF to fully reap these benefits. 
However, there are a number of issues for further consideration, in particular related to 
the absorption capacity of developing countries and intergenerational distribution. The 
World Bank’s conservative estimates show that in the short-term US$ 30 billion could 
easily be absorbed by those developing countries with sound institutions and policies.11 
Over time, as more countries improve their policies, an extra US$ 50 billion could be 
absorbed. This would fit with the temporal profile of IFF disbursements as depicted in 
Chart 2. However, regarding aid effectiveness there are also arguments against 
frontloading and in favour of a more gradual phasing-in of aid over time, for example 
because of improvements in the harmonisation and co-ordination among donors, 
improved management of aid flows at the recipient’s end allowing a higher absorption 
capacity, or to avoid economic shocks arising from sudden large aid flows which could 
negatively impact on macroeconomic stability. 
Frontloading could also imply that the generation of ‘poor’ of today would be favoured 
compared to the one of tomorrow (i.e. post-2015), since more efforts would be made now 
to reduce poverty12. Although it seems plausible to assume that the marginal utility of aid 
declines as people become less poor over time, the difference is probably too small to be 
significant, in the context of absolute poverty. There might therefore be no strong 
argument for discriminating between generations. Moreover, the relative geographic 
composition of poor people might change over time. While today the largest number of 
poor people is in Asia, tomorrow it will mostly be in Africa. Frontloading could hence 
raise the issue of an intertemporal discrimination of treatment between the poor. 
Furthermore, after the disbursement period, donors’ contributions to the IFF will be used 
only to reimburse IFF bondholders rather than to provide funds to developing countries. 
In case the self-sustaining process of development did not happen in many of the 
                                                 
11 World Bank, “Supporting sound policies with adequate and appropriate financing”, paper 
prepared for the Development Committee of 22 September 2003. 
12 See also the Landau report. 
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recipient countries and development needs did thus not diminish substantially, the next 
generation of poor could be faced, ceteris paribus, with a decrease in aid. Whether that 
implies a decline in absolute amounts of aid would then depend on the general evolution 
of ODA. The best way to avoid these intergenerational distortions would therefore be to 
concentrate IFF disbursements into projects with a high social rate of return and hence a 
large overall impact on present and future generations. 
Frontloading also raises the issue of intergenerational fairness within donor countries. 
The IFF would allow an increase in ODA at the expense of an increase in future public 
liabilities, thereby transferring costs to future generations. This future fiscal burden 
would occur precisely at a time when many countries, in particular EU Member States, 
will need to make higher expenditure linked to ageing. 
(ii) Recording in the national accounts of donors 
An important question relates to the treatment in national accounts of the IFF operations. 
This matters in particular for the EU Member States and their obligations to avoid 
excessive government deficits. The way Eurostat would treat the IFF under ESA 95 
depends critically on the final and precise features of the IFF, in particular its 
institutional structure when it is effectively launched, and therefore no final decision may 
yet be expected from Eurostat. As a general rule, the ESA 95 system records flows on an 
accrual basis, that is, when economic value is created, transformed or extinguished, or 
when claims and obligations arise, are transformed or are cancelled.  
The treatment of the IFF in national accounts depends critically on whether it is 
considered an institutional unit or not, depending primarily on its degree of autonomy in 
decision-making. If it is not considered to be an institutional unit, it would act on behalf 
of participating countries whose government deficit and debt positions would be 
proportionally affected by the IFF’s operations. Therefore, there would be an effect on 
participating countries’ deficit at the moment in which funds are disbursed by the IFF to 
recipient countries, and on participating countries’ debt when bonds are issued by the 
IFF. If, on the contrary, it is considered to be an institutional unit, the IFF might be 
classified as an ‘international organisation’ in the ‘rest of the world’ sector. In this case, 
the key issue is at which moment the donors’ contributions should be recorded as 
government expenditure. Given that the accrual-based ESA95 system requires the 
recording of expenditure when an obligation arises, there are mainly two possibilities 
depending on the exact contractual relationship between participating countries and IFF: 
1. Donors’ pledges to the IFF could be regarded as the obligation which requires 
the recording as expenditure in the budget plans according to the time schedule 
of the commitments to the IFF. These pledges would have a multi-annual 
profile, and the UK proposal foresees a number of subsequent pledging rounds, 
each of which should be reflected as expenditure in the respective budgets of a 
donor country (i.e. the 30-year payments profile in Chart 2). In practice, actual 
payments of a donor country to the IFF could be lower due to the non-
compliance of some of the recipient countries with the financing conditions. 
2. The obligation could also be considered to be the IFF issuing the bond which 
creates the donors’ commitment to repay. It would then be appropriate to record 
the amount of the issued bond – i.e. the share representing the country’s 
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participation in the IFF - as government expenditure (i.e. over the initial 15-year 
horizon in Chart 2).13 Depending on the type of bond, due interest payments 
would have to be added to that amount. With the exception of interest payments, 
administrative costs and a potential risk reserve, this is equivalent to recording 
expenditure at the moment the IFF disburses to recipient countries, if we assume 
no time lag between the two operations.  
If no equivalent reduction in expenditure or increase in revenue is made in a participating 
country’s budget, this would imply an equivalent change in the budget balance. The 
second possibility would give a higher degree of fiscal transparency in that it more 
adequately reflects the future liabilities of a country, but would have a frontloaded effect 
on budget balances.  
The UK proposal argues that because of the existence of financing conditions (i.e. the 
donor country only paying to the IFF if recipient countries fulfil specified conditions) 
donors’ contributions are ‘contingent liabilities’ and hence should be recorded only when 
effectively paid to the IFF. Contingent liabilities are expenditures that are recorded only 
when a certain event takes place, such as the calling of guarantees when a default occurs. 
Indeed, the scheme foresees that, if one or more recipient countries do not fulfil the 
financing conditions, donors would have to contribute less to the IFF than initially 
pledged. However, this boils down to the question of the probability of recipient 
countries not fulfilling the financing conditions. The UK proposal is to use prolonged 
arrears to the IMF as the only condition which would trigger a reduction of payments to 
the IFF. Statistics prepared for the UK Treasury mention that out of 100 countries funded 
by the IDA during the last 25 years, 21 countries went into prolonged arrears to the IMF. 
Given that this is rather the exception than the rule, it would seem inappropriate with a 
view to fiscal transparency to record nothing in government expenditure plans because of 
a small possibility of all recipient countries not fulfilling the financing conditions.  
Apart from these accounting issues, it remains to be confirmed that national budgetary 
procedures allow donors to make full contractual or legal commitments to the IFF for a 
period of up to 30 years – or to credibly renew shorter-term commitments on a multi-year 
basis.14 Moreover, it remains to be clarified whether current OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) calculation rules, which are based on donors’ outflows, 
would classify IFF-related expenditure as ODA on the basis of issued bonds, 
disbursements to recipient countries or actual payments to the IFF. 
(iii) Institutional and governance issues 
The UK proposal states that the IFF would have two components: a treasury platform to 
raise the funds, and a central trust to determine overall policy (e.g. fund allocation to 
disbursement channels, monitoring compliance with aid allocation and aid effectiveness 
principles). It would disburse its assistance through existing multilateral and bilateral 
channels to reduce the risk that the facility rapidly develops its own institutional life with 
related high administrative costs. A new international development institution would 
increase the coordination burden with the existing ones. 
                                                 
13 This view is also supported by the Statistics Department of the IMF as mentioned in “Aid 
effectiveness and financing modalities”, background paper prepared by the IMF and WB for the 
2004 Annual meetings, September 2004, p.54, fn. 47. 
14 This could also make a participation of the European Community in the IFF difficult given its 
annual budget procedures and the limited time horizon of the financial perspectives. 
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For the first component, recent discussions point in particular to the possibility of using 
the existing treasury platforms of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), and 
establishing the IFF as a subsidiary or affiliate that is legally and financially separate. 
This option would bring advantages in terms of costs and management skills. No details 
are available on the second component, as these would presumably be determined by the 
donors subscribing to the IFF.  
Apart from the decision mechanism itself, an important aspect of governance of the IFF 
is to ensure that aid resources are delivered in the most effective way. The current 
proposal defines some ‘overarching principles’ for aid allocation. In particular funds 
should be used for poverty reduction, they should be untied, provided in multi-annual 
programmes, mainly in grant form, and disbursed to a wide range of recipients, while 
targeted at low-income countries. These principles are generally sound and in line with 
state of the art principles of aid effectiveness. However, the relation and consistency 
between the IFF’s principles and those applied by existing instruments through which the 
funds are channelled is still unclear. It could be that some existing channels apply less 
effective (or simply different) principles on aid, hence rendering the overarching 
principles not applicable or void of content. In other terms, channelling the funds through 
existing instruments may not be a guarantee for enhanced aid effectiveness. 
(iv) Financial structure 
The UK proposal assumes a scenario which sets donors’ annual payments at 
US$ 15 billion in 2006, rising by around 4% a year, in line with conservative long-term 
projections of nominal growth. The IFF’s stock of debt would peak at US$ 300 billion. 
This scenario would allow the IFF to disburse in total US$ 500 billion (in grants) over a 
14-year period starting in 2006. The bulk of disbursements would take place in the years 
up to 2015 and require total payments from donors of US$ 750 billion over a 28-year 
period starting in 2006.  
One of the main advantages of the IFF proposal is that it relies on pledges rather than 
initial injections of cash, capital or other collateral to back the bonds. However, from a 
financial point of view, only if a low risk to bondholders is ensured which translates such 
pledges into a good credit rating, the facility could be a superior alternative to the issuing 
of bonds by sovereign governments with a lower rating. 
In order to receive the expected AAA rating, the bonds issued by the IFF would have to 
fulfil strict conditions set by financial markets. The main conditions would be linked to 
donor countries’ ability and willingness to pay. For this purpose, donor countries are 
required not to opt out from their commitments, and hence donors should be legally 
bound to make the annual payments to the IFF, subject to fulfilment of the financing 
conditions by recipient countries.15  
The decision on the legal act of the IFF is therefore relevant for its rating and the related 
risk premium. An international treaty among participating donors would facilitate the 
                                                 
15 Goldman Sachs calculations for Standard and Poor’s indicate that three main factors will have an 
effect on the leverage limit and the objective of achieving an AAA rating:  
 - The credit quality of donors that would contribute with annual payment commitments to the IFF; 
 - The nature of the contractual obligation which binds donors to make annual payments to the IFF: 
the more binding, the highest the possible rating, and related to this 
 - The nature of the financing condition, e.g. recipients being in protracted arrears with the IMF.  
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legally binding character of the donors’ commitments. A major issue to clarify is who is 
to carry the risk if a donor country, whatever the reason, revokes its earlier commitments 
under the treaty. This is particularly critical in the phase after all disbursements have 
been made, since no downward adjustments can be made any more on the issuing of 
bonds, and when IFF debt still needs to be serviced. If this risk falls on the bondholders 
this might have a negative effect on the credit rating and the risk premium; if it is shared 
among the remaining donor countries it might be more difficult to get the initial political 
support for the ratification of the treaty. 
A further issue is the potential effect of IFF debt on the cost of borrowing on 
international capital markets. In case interest rates increased, this could have a negative 
effect on global investment and growth, which would also mitigate some of the expected 
positive effects in recipient countries. The UK proposal expects no effects on borrowing 
costs since “the international market for bonds similar to those the IFF would issue is 
very deep”. This expectation is made under the assumption of an AAA rating and would 
require further detailed analysis, also with a view to the possibility of a lower rating than 
assumed. 
4. TAX INSTRUMENTS 
Over the last decades there have been a number of proposals to introduce taxes at 
international level in order to increase the financing of development aid. Although these 
proposals are fairly diverse, they tend to be based on the same rationale compared to 
simply raising taxes at national level to increase the national aid budget:  
1. Coordinated action at EU or international level allows for less distortion with a 
view to the loss of a mobile tax base or the loss of competitiveness for an 
immobile tax base. 
2. Compared to other taxes they are expected to be less unpopular for taxpayers 
because the generated revenues are foreseen for a good cause, i.e. development 
aid. 
3. As a “double dividend” some of the proposals do not only raise revenues, but 
also internalise negative cross-border externalities. 
The geographical coverage for this paper, unlike many studies, would at this stage be the 
EU only. The application of the proposed measures should not hinge on a hypothetical 
international agreement. The taxes proposed to finance ODA can be summarised in the 
following “families”16: 
• Environmental/energy/transport-related taxes, like taxes on maritime 
transport, aviation, or a CO2 tax/charge; 
• Taxes on currency or financial transactions, like the Tobin tax; 
• Health-related food taxes, like a tax on the sugar content of food; 
• Taxes on the trade of arms; 
                                                 
16 This list builds on the Commission Globalisation Report, the ‘Landau’ report, and the ‘Lula’ 
Report. 
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• Taxes on the profits of large multinational companies. 
Some of these taxes will not be further discussed in this paper. Taxation of maritime 
transport would probably require a globally coordinated effort to address possibilities of 
tax avoidance and competitiveness effects, which are likely to be more significant than 
for air transport because maritime transport consists essentially of freight. Since health-
related food taxes do not exist in the Member States, technical implementation 
difficulties would be significant, for instance in the definition of the tax base. A specific 
tax on the profits of multinational companies does not appear as a viable long-term 
option, also because of the volatility of profits. Broadening the tax to cover all companies 
in the EU could have negative effects on their global competitiveness. Finally, the arms 
industry is both very competitive and highly concentrated, with a handful of countries 
representing a major part of the trade. Global participation would therefore be a condition 
for the efficiency of a tax on the arms trade, also to not endanger efforts to control illegal 
arms trade.  
Therefore, this section only looks at the kerosene tax, the flight departure tax, as well as 
the currency or financial transaction tax. A much broader analysis of several of these 
proposed taxes was already presented in the Commission’s Globalisation Report in 2002. 
In order to provide further background information for the discussion of these proposals, 
increased rates of existing taxes, like VAT and excise duties on motor fuels, are also 
discussed. A more detailed description of the specific characteristics of each of the tax 
proposals on the basis of the criteria of revenue-raising capacity, economic and 
competitiveness aspects, implementation, legal aspects and equity can be found in the 
Annex. The main text will focus on the revenue-raising capacity, on economic and 
competitiveness effects, and on some implementation and legal aspects, while a synthesis 
table on the strengths and weaknesses of the different taxes is presented at the end of the 
section.  
(i) The revenue-raising options 
The general effect of most of the taxes is to increase the relative price of specific goods 
or services. This usually leads to a reduction in demand and thereby to a gradual erosion 
of a part of the tax base in the medium to long run depending on the demand 
elasticities.17 Taxes on negative externalities are even explicitly designed to lead to a 
decrease in the tax base in that the activity producing external costs should be reduced. 
For the currency transaction tax, the high mobility of the tax base may additionally have 
the effect to relocate currency transactions to countries where the tax is not levied and 
would therefore require a rather high number of countries introducing the tax. In the case 
of the VAT, which does not change relative prices, but rather the price level, the 
possibilities of avoiding the tax are more limited, but there are risks of fraud or a shift of 
activities into the grey economy. Thus, there is a potential long-term conflict between the 
objectives of revenue generation and of the internalisation of negative externalities which 
might however be mitigated by economic growth. 
On aviation, one possibility is a tax on kerosene used for intra-Community and domestic 
flights. Several countries are currently already taxing aviation fuel used for domestic 
flights, like for instance the Netherlands (€200 / 1000 litres), Japan (€239 / 1000 l), the 
US (€6 / 1000 l at federal level, plus taxes at State level of up to €24 / 1000 l). A tax level 
                                                 
17 Econometric studies show that demand elasticities tend to be low in the short term, but much 
higher in the long term. Cf. OECD (2001), Environmentally-related taxes in OECD countries. 
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of €330 per 1000 litres, which corresponds to the Community minimum rate for diesel 
and kerosene in 2010 according to the Energy Tax Directive18, would raise around €6 to 
7 billion per year depending on the assumed price elasticity of demand for air travel. 
A further possibility on aviation is a flight departure tax levied on all flights leaving a 
Community airport. Such taxes are levied as a lump sum per chargeable passenger. If a 
tax rate of €10 on intra-Community flights and of €30 on international flights were 
applied, in addition to the taxes which already exist in Member States19, expected 
revenues are about €6 billion per year. 
Currency or financial transaction taxes are generally presented as addressing undesirable 
externalities such as short-term capital movements or excessive exchange rate volatility. 
Since most proposals do not provide a clear-cut indication of how to implement, collect 
and enforce the tax, tax proceeds are difficult to estimate. Assuming a single rate of 
0.01% applied on all currency transactions made by all operators in the EU-15, and based 
on data from the Bank for International Settlements on foreign exchange market 
turnover, the French Treasury estimates revenues in a range of €7 to 11 billion.20 
However, there is a high degree of uncertainty in the estimates since the price elasticity 
of transaction volumes is rather difficult to predict. 
As a benchmark for the above proposals, increasing the rates of existing taxes is also 
considered. VAT is an important source of revenue representing on average 7% of GDP 
in Member States. A surcharge of 0.5 percentage point to the existing VAT base would 
bring revenues of about €14 billion, taking into account feedback effects on the 
economy, which would reduce other tax revenues and increase some expenditure. An 
increase in excise duties on motor fuels could also be envisaged. With 338 billion litres 
(180 of diesel and 158 of petrol in EU 25) consumed annually, a surcharge of 3 cent on 
motor fuel duties would raise €11 to 12 billion of revenue, including additional VAT 
revenues and assuming basically no effect on fuel demand.  
(ii) Economic and competitiveness effects  
The relative price and demand reactions on the tax increases can have effects on the 
specific sectors in the EU, depending on the possibilities to pass the tax increase on to 
consumers and assuming that other non-EU countries would not introduce a similar tax. 
In the aviation sector, there could indeed be some distortion for EU carriers with regard 
to non-EU competitors when they operate on intra-EU routes and bilateral Air Service 
Agreements (ASA) would not allow taxing them in the same way as EU carriers. 
Furthermore, since the taxes would represent a higher share of the operating costs of low-
cost airlines and these companies are expected to have customers with a higher price 
elasticity, they could be more affected than traditional airlines. The tourism industry 
could also be affected by a kerosene tax. However, as flight is only one component of the 
tourist package, an increase in the flight price of up to 40 euros for return tickets is not 
expected to have a significant impact, also with a view to the overall positive outlook for 
the development of this sector. The impact of destination-switching within the EU and 
                                                 
18 Directive 2003/96/EC (OJ L283 of 31.10.2003, p. 51, as last amended by Directive 2004/75/EC 
(OJ L 157 of 30.04.2004, p. 100). 
19 An Air Passenger Transport is for instance to be paid in the UK, up to 40 GBP. 
20 There are also proposals for a two-tier structure of the Tobin tax to differentiate between normal 
and turbulent periods on foreign exchange markets. See Spahn, Paul Bernd (1996), The Tobin Tax 
and Exchange Rate Stability, in Finance and Development, IMF, June 1996, pp. 24-27. 
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with outside destinations is likely to be small, as most alternative destinations are 
geographically much more distant. Regarding the departure tax, the rate differentiation 
between intra-Community and international flights would help to maintain the 
attractiveness of European tourist destinations. Finally, since the departure tax would 
apply to all carriers, it would not necessarily distort competition. Departure tax and 
kerosene tax could also complement each other. 
Regarding the potential effects of the currency transaction tax on the financial sector in 
the EU, there is a high degree of uncertainty about the relocation of transactions to 
countries where such a tax is not levied. Furthermore, there is a risk of substitution of 
bank transactions by non-bank transactions. These changes could reduce the liquidity of 
some financial markets, which might even exacerbate their volatility. On motor fuel, the 
price elasticity is generally considered to be rather low, at least in the short run, so that 
no major immediate effects on transport volumes are to be expected. VAT is broadly 
neutral across sectors and has more effects at macroeconomic level. In all cases the 
potential negative effects could be mitigated by a phasing-in over several years which 
would give the sectors concerned more time for adjustment. 
The macroeconomic effects of tax increases are rather complex and can best be captured 
with a model-based simulation. Therefore, the potential impact of an increase in VAT 
rates in EU countries to finance an increase in development aid was simulated with the 
help of the Commission’s QUEST model.21 While VAT is different in some respect from 
other indirect taxes, in particular regarding the more limited possibilities of substituting 
demand to avoid the tax, most of the results should also hold – in proportion to their 
revenues - for other tax proposals in that all of them have an effect on the prices of 
consumption, while the net increase in tax revenues is transferred abroad.  
The simulation assumes that VAT rates are raised by 0.5 percentage points in all Member 
States included in the model (EU-15).22 This leads to higher consumer prices and a fall in 
consumption by roughly 1%. Workers are partly compensated for the increase in prices 
and the resulting increase in wages has a negative impact on employment. 
Unemployment increases by 0.2 percentage points. The overall effect on GDP is a 
decline of 0.13% in the long run. As it is assumed that the exercise must be budgetary 
neutral, and may not lead to deterioration in government budget balances, only the net 
revenues are used to finance additional spending on development aid (net transfers 
abroad in the table below).23 These include the revenue from the VAT rate increase 
taking into account that the tax base is smaller as consumption is reduced, as well as 
lower income tax revenues and more expenditure on unemployment benefits since higher 
wage costs lead to lower employment. Therefore, the additional funds available for more 
development aid (about 0.14% of GDP) are roughly half what would ex ante be expected 
to be raised by the rate increase (about 0.25% of GDP). The higher transfers to the rest of 
                                                 
21 For a description of the main features of the QUEST model see Roeger, Werner; Veld, Jan in 't 
(1997), QUEST II - A Multi-Country Business Cycle and Growth Model; Brussels (= DG II 
Economic Paper No.123) 
22 VAT rates in the model baseline are effective rates (the average effective VAT rate in the model is 
around 15%). It is assumed that the 0.5 percentage point increase is applied across the board (to 
standard and reduced rates). The presence of some zero-rated goods is not taken into account. As 
this only applies to a small share of goods in two member states (UK, IRL) this is not likely to 
have a significant impact on the overall results.  
23 These transfers are allocated in the model to Africa, Latin America and Asian countries 
(excluding OPEC or ASEAN countries). 
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the world partially flow back to the EU as recipient countries would raise their imports, 
softening the negative impact on consumption and output in the EU by roughly 15 to 
20%. 
Table 1: QUEST simulation on the macroeconomic effects of a 0.5 percentage point 
increase in VAT rates and higher transfers abroad (in EU-15, difference from baseline in 
% unless otherwise indicated) 
Year 
 
1 5 10 15 
GDP -0.24 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 
Consumption -0.94 -1.09 -1.00 -0.91 
Unemployment rate (%-p) 0.12 0.21 0.21 0.21 
VAT revenue (% of GDP) 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.26 
Transfers abroad (% of GDP) 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Source: DG ECFIN 
Apart from these macroeconomic effects of tax increases, the general efficiency of taxes 
as an instrument for the internalisation of negative externalities should also be analysed. 
In the set of instruments of environmental policy, taxes are one possible instrument 
among others, such as quantitative restrictions or tradable emission certificates. In this 
perspective, the Commission services are currently preparing a Communication for later 
this year on aviation and climate change, setting out possible approaches for a 
contribution of the aviation sector to the reduction of the climate change impact of its 
activities. Whilst kerosene taxation is one of the economic instruments relevant for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions to be considered, a decision to use kerosene taxation 
as a source for generating revenue for ODA may have an impact on initiatives on the use 
of economic instruments for the purpose of managing the environmental dimension of 
the aviation sector. 
Similarly, the efficiency of a financial or currency transaction tax in stabilising foreign 
exchange or financial markets needs to be compared with that of other options, such as 
for example the international coordination of economic policies. These alternative 
instruments usually do not raise tax revenues, but it could be a preferable strategy to 
apply the more efficient instrument to internalise negative externalities, while more 
traditional channels are used to raise tax revenues. 
(iii) Other aspects 
There are a number of issues related to the implementation and legal aspects of the 
different tax instruments. Regarding implementation, excise duties, VAT and departure 
taxes would not create particular problems. As for other mineral oil products, aviation 
kerosene would be taxed when delivered for consumption. In order to reduce 
implementation problems of a tax on currency transactions taxing net positions at the 
level of a centralised settlement system could be an option to be further assessed. Such a 
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mechanism might avoid some of the implementation difficulties inherent to the 
application of a tax to all currency transactions. 
A legal issue remaining to be clarified is the compatibility of a currency transaction tax 
with the EC Treaty as regards the free movement of capital and payments (Article 56 
TEC). The main concern is the discrimination of transactions between countries with 
different currencies – including intra-EU transactions – compared to those within a 
country and within the euro area. To avoid this problem it could be envisaged to have a 
tax on all financial transactions, which may, however, have adverse effects on EU 
financial markets. Furthermore, it needs to be clarified whether such a tax would be 
compatible with GATS rules and other international obligations. 
A kerosene tax would also involve some legal issues related to third country carriers. The 
1944 Chicago Convention, which was established when aviation was an infant industry, 
requires that fuel on board of an aircraft of a State, upon arrival in another State and 
retained on board when leaving that State, must be exempt from taxes. Until 2003, 
kerosene for international aviation was exempted under the former EC Mineral Oils 
Directive24. From 2004 onwards, the Energy Tax Directive allows for taxation of 
kerosene used for domestic and intra-EU flights under certain conditions. However, most 
bilateral Air Services Agreements (ASAs) between States still oblige the Parties to 
exempt kerosene supplied to Parties' aircrafts. In this context, the ASAs would have to be 
modified with a view to the so called fifth freedom of third country carriers, taking into 
account the wide spread use of code-sharing25 on intra Community routes, in order to 
allow for the taxation of kerosene on all intra-Community flights. However, in practice, a 
kerosene tax on intra-Community and domestic flights could be implemented by making 
it mandatory while allowing for the possibility to exempt all carriers on specific routes 
where non-EU carriers operate and benefit from exemptions under unchanged ASAs. 
Ongoing renegotiation of ASAs would then gradually allow for the taxation of third 
country carriers on intra-EU flights. 
                                                 
24 Council Directive 92/81/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise 
duties on mineral oils (OJ L 316, 31.10.1992, p. 12. Directive amended by Directive 94/74/EC 
(OJ L 365, 31.12.1994, p. 46)). 
25 Code sharing relates to an intra-Community flight of a Community carrier, using in addition to its 
own flight number the flight number of a another (here third country) carrier. 
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5. ADDITIONAL DEBT RELIEF PROPOSALS  
The experience with the HIPC Initiative26 has shown that debt relief can be an effective 
way of channelling aid: it provides untied, stable and predictable flows of aid, at rather 
low transaction costs. Inscribing the Initiative within the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
process has also ensured a right balance between country ownership and incentive 
mechanisms for reforms. 
So far27, out of the 42 eligible countries, 27 have actually entered the initiative and are 
receiving debt relief. As a result, their debt stock has been reduced by two thirds, and 
debt service as a percentage of exports has declined substantially (from 16% in 1998 to 
around 10% in 2004). Moreover, the savings from debt repayments have been 
increasingly channelled towards poverty reduction expenditure (mostly for health or 
education), which increased from 6.4% of GDP in 1999 to 8% of GDP in 2004 in the 27 
countries. 
The Initiative however still faces a number of challenges. Its financing is not yet secured; 
both commercial and non-Paris Club official creditors have not yet fully participated; 
moreover, the current resources of the HIPC Trust Fund, managed by the World Bank, 
will soon be exhausted. The Bank foresees a financial gap of US$1.9 billion between 
2006 and 2008. Furthermore, there are a number of HIPC eligible post-conflict countries, 
such as Sudan or Somalia, which have not yet entered the HIPC initiative, and which 
may not be able to do it before the final deadline, end-2006. The international community 
should probably seek solutions to address the specific needs of these countries and help 
them return to normal economic relations with the rest of the world. Finally, there is 
some evidence that several countries that graduate from HIPC are falling back into high 
indebtedness, with debt-to-exports ratios higher by between 19% and 40% than originally 
foreseen. This occurs despite the fact that most Paris Club creditors are committed to 
100% debt relief. These considerations have probably motivated the recent proposals – in 
their various versions (see Box 2) - for a deeper debt relief of up to 100% multilateral 
debt cancellation, covering IMF, IDA and African Development Fund (AfDF) debt28.  
Box 2: Proposals for additional debt relief 
The US proposal simply calls for 100% multilateral debt relief to HIPC countries. For the IMF 
part, financing would come from existing reserves (PRGF Trust Fund and the Special 
Disbursement Account). According to IMF staff figures, the cost would be US$ 6 billion. For the 
IDA and AfDF part, the claims would be simply written off, without any donor replenishment. 
Debt relief would therefore be financed by reducing the IDA and AfDF allocations of beneficiary 
                                                 
26 The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) was launched in 1996 by the IMF and 
the WB, and enhanced in 1999, with the aim of reducing their debt burden to sustainable levels, 
including debt to multilateral institutions. The overall cost of the Initiative for the current eligible 
countries is estimated at $54.5 billion (in 2003 NPV terms). HIPC has been recently extended to 
end-2006, to allow remaining countries to enter. 
27 See “HIPC Initiative: Status of Implementation” joint World Bank-IMF paper for the Annual 
Meetings, August 2004. 
28 In fact the HIPC Initiative cancelled on average only 50% of multilateral debt. Proposals do not 
address the small-sized claims of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank since they can finance debt cancellation by themselves. The credits of IFAD 
and other smaller multilateral institutions however could raise concerns in terms of fair burden-
sharing. 
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countries, hence leaving net transfers unchanged. The action would not provide additional 
resources to developing countries.  
The UK proposal calls for 100% relief of multilateral debt service (interest and principal) of poor 
countries for the period 2005-2015. In a first stage, this additional debt relief will be available to 
all post-completion point HIPCs (currently 15, but some more will qualify in the coming 
months), and IDA-only low income countries with well performing public finance management, 
being in practice the Poverty Reduction Support Credit eligible countries (such as Armenia, 
Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Vietnam). In contrast to the US proposal, this action is to be 
funded through additional donor resources for the part of the debt owed to the World Bank and 
the African Development Bank (estimated at US$ 0.5 billion in 2005 and between US$ 1.5 
billion and US$ 2.3 billion in 2015), and a mobilisation of IMF gold reserves for the IMF part.  
The French proposal calls for a debt service relief to be provided in case an exogenous shock hits 
eligible countries (post-completion point HIPCs and non-HIPC IDA-only countries) and debt 
service to export ratios reach certain thresholds. Specific grant windows would be created within 
IDA and AfDF, funded both by additional donor resources and internal resources. Costs cannot 
be assessed at present, as the debt thresholds have yet to be defined. 
The proposal by the Commission for Africa calls for a transparent debt compact to include all 
Sub-Saharan African low-income countries, including those excluded from current schemes, 
which should cancel debt stock and debt service by up to 100% and cover multilateral and 
bilateral debt. No further details have been made public, nor has it been costed. 
While the ultimate goal of these proposals seems legitimate, namely freeing resources in 
developing countries for the attainment of the MDGs, the merit of each proposal should 
be assessed against its capacity to minimise the risk of moral hazard and distortion in aid 
allocation. Moral hazard arises because 100% multilateral debt relief would sideline 
those poor countries that have managed their debts carefully, and weaken the credit and 
financial discipline culture in recipient countries. As underlined by a Commission funded 
study29, debt relief can distort the allocation of aid across poor countries since it appears 
that (i) there is little correlation between the level of poverty and the amount of debt 
relief and (ii) within the group of HIPCs, those benefiting most are not the best 
performers in terms of policy and institutions. Unless they are properly designed, further 
debt relief actions could therefore exacerbate this distortion.  
The study also points out the weak evidence of additionality of debt relief relative to the 
Monterrey ODA commitments, whereby it appears that HIPC relief may indeed have 
been used as a means to reach the Monterrey targets. In addition, there may be a risk of 
overstating DAC/ODA figures, namely because of a mismatch between the HIPC debt 
relief recorded and the one effectively received, the lack of analysis of the amounts 
effectively “liberated” in recipient countries, or the reporting of the nominal values of 
credits cancelled. 
The recently approved Debt Sustainability Framework of the IMF and the World Bank, 
when operationalised, should provide ex-ante guidance on the best combination of grants 
and loans to be provided to recipient countries, based on the quality of their policies and 
institutions. Over time, this should therefore help avoiding situations of over-
indebtedness, and hence limit moral hazard attached to debt cancellation operations. 
                                                 
29 “Beyond the HIPC Initiative”, March 2004, available on 
 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/theme/hipc/docs/Beyond_HIPC_en.pdf#zoom
=100  
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On aid allocation, it is clear that concentrating 100% cancellation on post-completion 
point HIPCs rather than on all HIPCs would not yield the same result. Post-completion 
countries should have improved their policies and institutions, hence additional debt 
relief should have a less distortive effect. A tentative analysis carried out on the 20 post-
completion point HIPCs and IDA-only countries indicates that while debt relief would be 
allocated to the poorest, there would still not be a strong link to their performance, as 
measured by their CPIAs30. 
In terms of financing, the proposals have differing merits. While the US proposal 
requires no additional funding from donors, it reduces the financial capacity, hence the 
role, of the financial institutions in low-income countries; it also puts a heavier burden on 
European countries, which have gained a stronger weight in the latest IDA-14 
replenishment, hence raising an equity issue among donors. 
In the UK proposal, the call for additional donor resources for the World Bank part could 
be at the expense of the need to fill the existing financing gap in the HIPC Trust Fund. 
There are also potential downsides to the use of a substantial share of IMF gold holdings 
to finance debt relief. As an undervalued asset, gold provides a fundamental strength to 
the IMF’s balance sheet31. Any mobilization of IMF gold should therefore avoid 
weakening its overall financial position. Whenever feasible, profits from any gold sales 
could be used to create an investment fund, of which only the income should be used. 
Moreover, as the world’s third largest holder of gold, the IMF has a systemic 
responsibility to avoid causing disruptions to the functioning of the gold market. Since 
the gold market is rather shallow, gold sales by the Fund could negatively affect not only 
the value of the holdings of all other official gold holders, but also the profitability of the 
gold mining industry, including in many gold-producing developing countries. Finally, 
any decision on IMF gold sales requires an 85% majority of total voting power, with the 
US (17.1% of the votes) holding an effective veto over the issue.32 
6. INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS IN THE USE OF FUNDS 
As reflected in the main body of this paper, the debate has so far focussed on innovative 
sources of financing. There is, however, an urgent need to complement these 
considerations with a discussion on innovative mechanisms for aid delivery, to ensure the 
greatest possible effectiveness for the use of additional resources – whatever their origin - 
hence allowing concrete progress in reaching the MDGs.  
One aspect of this is the risk of fragmentation of aid if particular sources of finance are 
linked to specific activities. This risks neglecting the lessons on aid effectiveness and the 
centrality of country ownership, and reducing the gains from more predictable flows of 
funds by introducing rigidities in developing countries’ budgets. 
Actions to improve aid effectiveness would translate into gains for recipient countries: 
enhancing co-ordination of policies and harmonisation of procedures would bring 
                                                 
30 CPIAs are Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, which are based on indicators used by 
the World Bank to assess the ‘quality’ of a country’s policy and institutional framework. 
31 The IMF holds 103.4 million ounces of gold with a book value of SDR 5.9 billion (about $9 
billion) and a current market value of some $44 billion, an undervaluation of some $35 billion. 
32 In this context, it should be recalled that any decisions on IMF gold sales have to be approved by 
the US Congress, whose opinion binds the US Executive Director when a Board vote is taken. 
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reduction in transaction costs; further untying aid ensures better value for money in 
goods and services; greater aid predictability allows longer-term commitments. 
Nevertheless, development gains depend primarily on improved policies and institutions 
in developing countries themselves. 
The ongoing international process on aid effectiveness provides a positive impetus. The 
results of the work at EU level as well as the political commitments made by the 
international community as a whole, and by the EU, at the recent “High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness” in Paris, provide a comprehensive agenda for immediate 
implementation. The EU is committed to further improving the effectiveness of its aid 
based on the comprehensive agenda agreed at EU and global level. The Communication 
on financing for development and aid effectiveness prepared by the Commission services 
intends to present policy initiatives in that regard. 
Aid effectiveness is also maximised by ensuring the right balance among the available 
aid modalities. Project aid is not designed for supporting the financing of the increased 
recurrent costs implied by any policy aimed at achieving the MDGs. The results however 
are more easily monitored or evaluated (both ex-ante and ex-post). By requiring no 
separate accounting or reporting, budget support is an effective form of aid to support 
harmonisation of procedures. By providing resources to the national budget, it also 
guarantees alignment of aid with national priorities, as well as providing the flexibility to 
finance the most urgent needs for the country to make progress towards the MDGs. At 
the same time, it requires a sound framework in recipient countries for public expenditure 
management, to ensure accountability and transparency in the use of funds. Debt relief is 
both predictable and flexible and therefore represents a highly effective aid modality. 
However, it can only complement other sources of financing for the MDGs since it 
allocates resources according to a country’s debt stock rather than its needs and capacity 
to use funds effectively to reduce poverty. 
Apart from the inherent characteristics of each of the existing aid modalities, the stability 
and predictability of ODA flows is also constrained by the unpredictability of the 
existing sources of development finances, which are to a considerable extent always 
vulnerable to changes in donors’ budgetary priorities. Limiting such vulnerability 
through dedicated sources of revenues, as in the tax proposals, or by locking in future 
pledges, as in the IFF, could support the financing of more predictable aid modalities. 
New options for flexible, stable and predictable aid modalities, to be deployed in high-
performance countries, are being explored by the Commission services. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The aim of this paper was to inform the debate in the EU on the proposals for increasing 
the financing of development aid with a view to achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals. Based on a number of criteria, the advantages and disadvantages of each of the 
different options were briefly discussed. While certainly none of the options would be a 
single perfect solution, most of them are not mutually exclusive and a combination of 
different options could be envisaged. This could be all the more interesting since they are 
likely to require a different timing to take account of preparations needed for their 
implementation, phasing-in possibilities or the medium-term erosion of the tax base. A 
combination of options would also diversify the risks arising from the uncertainties on 
some of the more innovative proposals. 
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ANNEX: ANALYTICAL FICHES ON TAX INSTRUMENTS 
Criteria for the assessment of the tax instruments 
The criterion "Revenue raising capacity" relates to the amount of Government revenues 
which could be generated and to its stability over time. Considering the global target, a 
threshold has been set at 5 billion euros as a minimum level of the annual revenue raising 
capacity. An efficiency aspect has also to be considered here. This concept relates to the 
extent to which the tax will contribute to its objective and at which cost. As a general 
principle, it depends on the price elasticity of the tax base and the possibilities of 
relocation or substitution, which might reduce the tax base if a tax is introduced. It should 
be highlighted that very little is known or can be measured in the cases of taxes which 
have not been applied in practice, such as a tax on financial transactions. 
The assessment of the economic effects concentrates on competitiveness issues. When 
relevant, other aspects are examined, like the impact on growth, inflation, and 
employment. The environmental dimension is included here as appropriate.  
Implementation refers mainly to compliance and administrative costs. Risks of 
fraud/avoidance linked to the specific instrument will also be assessed, when relevant. 
Legal aspects are analyzed, to pinpoint the legal requirements/conditions for the setting 
up of the measure. 
Finally, equity has to be considered when assessing the impact of a tax. Horizontal equity 
refers to the principle that “equals should receive an equal treatment”, while vertical 
equity refers to the progressivity of the tax among taxpayers. In the framework of an 
international debate, equity is connected to the impact of the tax on the distribution of 
income between countries. 
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Kerosene taxation used for intra-Community and national flights by EU carriers 
(330 € / 1000 l)
33
 
Criteria Comments 
Revenue raising 
capacity 
Based on current air transport volumes, estimates vary from € 6 to 7 billion annually, 
taking into account a decrease in demand due to higher prices. Fuel efficiency 
improvements are not included in the higher figure as they will have an impact on 
revenues mainly in the medium term. However, this effect will be at least partially offset 
by the strong growth of air transport demand in the longer term. The difficulties related to 
code-sharing practices with non-EU carriers need to be further assessed. 
Economic aspects 
/ Competitiveness 
 
Estimates show that the tax would double fuel costs, which currently represent on average 
about 15% of the operational costs for intra-EU flights. Using the assumption that 100% of 
the costs are transferred to customers, the tax would translate into fare increases of 10 to 
20 euro for one-way tickets. Estimates for average price elasticities in aviation for the 
whole market typically range between -0.6 and -1.134. The impact on air travel demand 
would be the following: 
Elasticity high (-1.1) medium (-0.8) low (-0.6)
Impact on demand -15% -11% -8%  
In the longer term, the reduction in demand would be more than offset by factors that 
increase the demand for air travel (higher income level etc.), and airlines would also 
respond to the increased fuel costs by reducing fuel consumption through changes in 
operations and the use of more energy-efficient aircrafts.  
The impact of the tax on airlines profits depends in the short term on their ability to pass 
the fuel cost increase on to customers. If the increase is entirely passed on to customers, 
then the impact on airlines’ operating results, stemming from reduced demand, would 
remain limited. Extrapolating from former modelling exercises, the operating result of EU 
carriers as a share of revenues is expected to decrease only moderately. However, recent 
large fluctuations in the price of kerosene require that the above arguments are taken with 
some caution. 
Low-cost airlines would be more affected than traditional airlines, both because of a higher 
share of fuel in their costs and a higher price elasticity of demand. Although the definition 
of a common tax rate at EU level would limit the risk of distortion of competition, fuel 
taxation on EU carriers only would create distortions of competition with non-EU carriers 
operating on intra-EU flights. However, non EU carriers currently operate physically less 
than 5% of this market, mainly for freight, in connection to constraints imposed by 
bilateral agreements. To limit the tax-related distortions of competition, renegotiation of 
international Air Services Agreements (ASAs) should aim at levelling the playing field 
between EU and non EU carriers (see below). Finally, conditions of competition would be 
fairer towards other transport modes (road), which are currently taxed. 
A gradual introduction of the kerosene tax, over several years, would not lead to a net 
reduction in air transport demand but rather reduce its rate of growth. 
Environmental The tax on aircraft fuel would decrease CO2 emissions by decreasing the demand for air 
travel, and by giving airline companies more incentives to improve aircraft fuel-efficiency. 
                                                 
33 Community minimum rate applicable to kerosene and diesel as of 2010. 
34 Cf. notably Gillen, Morrison, Stewart (2003), Élasticités de la demande de transport aérien de 
passagers: Concepts, problèmes et measures; DETR (2000), Valuing the external cost of aviation, 
2000, and DETR, Air traffic forecasts for the United Kingdom; Resource Analysis et al. (2000), 
Aviation Emissions and Evaluation of Reduction Options (AERO); ICAO (1995), Outlook for air 
transport to the year 2003. Elasticities differ between different types of flights, being higher for 
short-haul and for leisure flights than for long-haul and for business flights. 
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effects Aviation is the source of other emissions (NOx, PMs, HC, SO2), which have an impact on 
climate and local air quality. The impact on climate is estimated to be 2-4 times that of 
CO2 emissions mainly because NOx emissions and condensation trails in high altitudes 
(Environmental assessment report no 10, EEA 2003). 
Implementation Aviation kerosene would be taxed when delivered to consumption, as other mineral oils 
are. For the acceptability of the tax, administrative and compliance costs are expected to 
remain limited. However, it should be taken into account that some aircraft are operated 
for extra-EU flights following intra-EU flights. With only a small number of operators, the 
risk of fraud would also be low. An extensive geographical coverage may be relevant to 
secure the effectiveness of a tax on aviation fuel. It would appear useful to negotiate with 
Switzerland, the EEA and Croatia, to take part in the measure, in order to limit re-routing 
or tankering. 
Legal aspects The current tax exemption for kerosene for international aviation is included in Directive 
2003/96/EC, which allows Member States to tax kerosene on domestic flights or via 
bilateral agreements between MS. In addition, Art. 24 of the Chicago Convention provides 
that the kerosene which is contained on board of an aircraft of a contracting State on 
arrival in the territory of another State and retained onboard on leaving the territory of that 
State shall be exempt from tax in the country of arrival. When a third country carrier has 
access to intra-Community routes by using the so called 5th freedom rights under its 
bilateral ASA with Member States, the fuel used for these services is exempted from 
taxation as long as the bilateral agreements are not amended. Code-sharing on intra-
Community flights makes it difficult for Member States to distinguish taxation between 
Community operators and third country operators. The amendment of bilateral ASAs 
between Member States and third countries allowing for the taxation of kerosene would 
therefore be necessary for the taxation of kerosene on all intra-Community flights. Or, 
conversely, distortion effects could be eliminated by exempting all carriers on specific 
routes where non-EU carriers operate in direct competition with EU carriers and where 
remaining legal obligations in ASAs continue to prevent them from being taxed. 
Negotiations to modify ASAs are currently ongoing at different levels and could provide 
an opportunity to insert the necessary tax provisions. In this legal framework, in order to 
tax kerosene on intra-Community and domestic flights, two possibilities exist: i) amending 
the Energy Tax Directive to make such taxation mandatory, or ii) Member States decide to 
tax their national flights, and amend their bilateral agreements foreseen under Art. 14 (2) 
of Directive 2003/96/EC in order to include the taxation of intra-Community flights. 
Equity The tourism industry and countries/regions that are dependent on long distance transport 
for tourism would be more affected. However, the flight is only one component of the 
tourist package (including accommodation, catering, leisure); an increase in the flight price 
of € 20 to € 40 for return tickets is not expected to have a significant impact on tourism. 
Moreover, the demand for tourism–related travel is likely to increase in the future due to 
other factors (increasing income level, number of pensioners) and these factors are likely 
to counter-act the demand impact of higher travel prices in the long-run. Modelling shows 
that the impact of destination-switching within the EU and with outside destinations is 
likely to be small, as most alternative destinations are geographically much more distant. 
As regards the impact on consumers, low-budget air consumers would be more affected by 
the measure. As air travel represents a much higher share of spending of high-income than 
of low-income households, the overall impact of the tax would be progressive. 
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Departure tax: € 10 on intra-Community flights and € 30 on international flights 
Criteria Comments 
Revenue raising 
capacity 
Around € 6 billion annually, taking into account the demand reaction due to the price 
increase. The revenues are similar to the ones stemming from the kerosene tax option 
because, while the tax base is wider if all flights leaving the EU are included, the average 
rate is lower. 
Economic aspects / 
Competitiveness 
The impact of a departure tax of € 10 on demand for intra-European flights would be 
somewhat lower than the impact of kerosene taxation since it corresponds to a lower 
average ticket price increase (10 compared with € 10 to € 20). Moreover, a departure tax 
of 30 euros would also apply to international flights departing from the EU, which 
increases the overall impact on demand. 
For a range of price elasticities between -0.6 and -1.1, and assuming that 100% of the tax 
would be borne by customers (which means that airlines would not adjust pre-tax prices 
to partially offset its impact on demand), the impact on demand would be the following, 
based on preliminary estimates: 
Elasticity Intra-EU flights Flights from EU
high (1,1) -10% -15%
medium (0,8) -7% -11%
low (0,6) -5% -8%
Impact on demand
 
The negative impact of the departure tax on airlines profits would remain limited if the 
cost of the tax is entirely borne by customers (i.e. assuming no pre-tax adjustment of 
fares), as it would only result from reduced demand. The decrease in airlines revenues 
from intra-EU flights would be smaller than in the kerosene tax option, as the tax is 
lower, but revenues from flights to extra-EU destinations would also be reduced. 
Extrapolating from former modelling exercises, the operating result of EU carriers as a 
share of revenues is expected to decrease only moderately.  
Low cost airlines would be more affected than traditional ones, both because the tax 
would represent a higher share of the average ticket price, and because of a higher price 
elasticity of demand, unless there is a tax rate differentiation. 
As regards the impacts on other economic sectors which rely on air transport, in 
particular the tourism industry, as in the case of the kerosene tax, they are the result of 
two effects: first, a net reduction in air travel demand, and second, destination switching. 
The main impact on tourism would come from reduced air travel demand, also taking 
into account substitution with land transport. The impact on tourism through destination 
switching would mainly concern non-EU travellers, as for travellers departing from the 
EU, international flights would be covered by the tax; in addition, the tax differentiation 
between intra-Community and international flights would help to maintain the 
attractiveness of European tourist destinations. 
As regards the competitiveness of airlines, the effects of any differentiated taxation 
between EU and non-EU carriers on international routes from the EU would potentially 
have a stronger impact than on intra-EU routes, since competition of non European 
airlines is higher. However, as the departure tax would apply to all carriers, it would not 
create direct distortions of competition. Indirect effects of the tax on EU carriers through 
reduced demand on their home market are likely to be very small according to previous 
studies35. 
                                                 
35 Economic incentives to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from air transport in Europe, study 
made for the European Commission, CE Delft, 2002. 
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Environmental 
effects 
A departure tax would not provide incentives for energy-efficiency improvements, but 
would reduce emissions through the impact on reduced demand for air travel. The impact 
on overall economic efficiency is less favourable than that of a fuel tax because it does 
not address directly externalities. However, the environmental impacts of the departure 
tax would be increased because of the larger tax base, as international flights departing 
from the EU, including long haul flights, would be covered. Taking also into account the 
lower rates, the environmental impacts are likely to be of the same order of magnitude as 
those of the fuel tax, at least in the short to medium term. In the longer term, the absence 
of incentives for improved fuel efficiency would make this option less favourable. 
Implementation Several Member States have already implemented taxes similar to departure taxes. The 
taxable event consists in the carriage from a Community airport of chargeable passengers 
on chargeable aircraft. 
Differentiated rates can be applied, one for domestic and intra-Community destinations, 
and one for other destinations. The class of travel (economy, business) could also be 
taken into consideration. 
The tax can be collected by operators of chargeable aircraft. 
Charge avoidance is likely to be smaller than in the case of a fuel tax, since fuel tankering 
would not be an option and the only way of avoiding the tax would be for passengers to 
change the origin of travel. 
Legal aspects A departure tax is compatible with the Community legislation when it does not 
distinguish between domestic and intra-Community flights. It needs to be clarified if a 
departure tax would be compatible with GATS rules and other international obligations. 
Equity Equity could be insured through differentiated tax rates. 
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Currency transaction taxes 
Criteria Comments 
Revenue raising 
capacity 
A number of studies suggest that a CTT could bring considerable revenues, sometimes 
estimated in the range of US$ 30-300 billion globally36. However, the underlying 
assumptions and parameters vary a lot, in particular with regard to the tax rate 
(sometimes of up to 1%) and the eventual impact of the CTT on transaction volumes. 
Figures calculated in the context of a unilateral application of the tax in the EU only and 
taking into account possible tax avoidance, and other changes of behaviour, lead to lower 
figures. According to estimates made by the French Treasury37, tax proceeds of a 
unilateral tax in the EU-15 applied on all banking transactions involving currency 
exchange would be within a range of € 7 to 11 billion (assuming a rate of 0.01%). The 
Belgian High Council for Finance (2001) reaches estimates of € 9 billion for an 
equivalent rate38. 
However, these figures need to be interpreted with caution. The simulations rely on 
assumptions, for instance, about the elasticity of transaction volumes to the tax rate that 
are not empirically verified. Both above-mentioned studies assume that transaction 
volumes would likely decrease significantly as tax rates increase. 
Economic aspects / 
Competitiveness 
The introduction of a currency transaction tax is likely to reduce the volume of 
transactions, which constitutes the base of the tax. According to the study conducted by 
the Belgian High Council for Finance the reduction effect is already significant at a 
0.01% level and becomes critical at a 0.05% tax rate for some types of operations. In the 
lower range of the tax, the volume reduction effects would be far more important for inter 
bank transactions (the largest share of the market) than for other financial institutions and 
the non-financial sector.  
The reduction in transaction volumes would to a large extent result from the relocation of 
taxed activity outside the scope of the European jurisdiction. The risks of substitution 
between financial products would also play an important role as bank transactions could 
be replaced by non-bank transactions. 
A currency transaction tax could reduce rather than increase liquidity, because the tax 
would increase the bid-ask spreads. This effect could lead not only to an additional 
reduction of the tax base, but also trigger a price reaction from the banking sector in order 
to maintain profitability.  
Finally, a unilaterally applied tax would negatively affect the competitiveness of 
European investments, since international portfolio risk diversification would be 
penalised by the tax. The effects of a liquidity reduction on exchange rate volatility are 
ambiguous. 
Implementation In most Tobin-type proposals, there is no precise information available on how the tax 
should be implemented in practice. Taxing individual buying and selling transactions 
would in theory lead to larger revenues, i.e. due to a large tax base, but the practical 
implementation of such a broad-based CTT remains largely unknown.  
Taxing net positions at the level of a centralised settlement system could reduce the 
administrative burden at the expense of a narrower tax base, but many features of such an 
approach remain unclear. 
                                                 
36 See for instance, Nissanke, Machiko, “Revenue Potential of the Tobin Tax for Development Finance: A 
critical appraisal,” Discussion paper 2003/81, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 
Helsinki. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, a rate of 0.1% would generate 72 
billion dollars. 
37 Rapport sur la taxation des opérations de change – Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie (23 
August 2000) 
38 Avis relatif à l'instauration éventuelle d'une taxe de type "Tobin"- Conseil Supérieur des Finances (June 
2003). 
 EN 30   EN 
Legal aspects The compatibility of the proposed tax with the EC Treaty is not established yet. A CTT 
could restrict the free movement of capital and payments (Art. 56 TEC). The tax could 
also discriminate transactions involving countries with different currencies – including 
intra-EU transactions – compared to those within one country and within the euro zone. 
The view of the European Central Bank, in an opinion relating to the Belgian tax model, 
was that the measure would not be compatible with the Treaty39.  
Furthermore, it needs to be checked whether such tax would be compatible with the 
GATS rules and other international obligations. 
Equity Very few studies have investigated the issue of equity for the currency transactions tax. 
The ultimate impact of the CTT would depend on its concrete implementation and the 
reactions of financial operators.  
Currency markets are highly concentrated in a few major markets, in particular the City 
of London. The introduction of a currency transactions tax in the EU would affect mainly 
these markets.  
Given the fact that it is impossible to single out purely financial from real transactions, all 
currency transactions between euro and non-euro EU currencies would be subject to tax, 
while trade between euro members would remain unaffected.  
                                                 
39 European Central Bank (2004), "Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 November 2004 at 
the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a draft law introducing a tax on exchange 
operations involving foreign exchange, banknotes and currency", CON/2004/34. 
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VAT: Applying a surcharge of 0.5 point of percentage to the existing VAT rates40 
Criteria Comments 
Revenue raising 
capacity 
Around € 14 billion annually taking into account the economic impact of the measure 
and a budget neutrality constraint.  
Revenue fluctuates according to the business cycle.  
Economic aspects / 
Competitiveness 
Using the results of the QUEST simulation (EU-15), a 0.5 percentage point increase in 
VAT would lead to a fall in the GDP growth of -0.24% the first year and -0.14% after 10 
years.  
The higher consumer prices driven by this VAT rate increase shrinks the consumption by 
1 percent. As workers are partially compensated for the increase in prices, the resulting 
increase in wages leads to a negative impact on employment. The unemployment rate 
increases by 0.2 percentage points. 
Year 
 
1 2 3 4 5  10  15 
GDP -0.24 -0.12 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16  -0.14  -0.13 
Consumption -0.94 -0.99 -1.07 -1.09 -1.09  -1.00  -0.91 
Employment -0.13 -0.18 -0.21 -0.22 -0.22  -0.23  -0.22 
Real wage costs 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02  0.03  0.04 
GDP inflation (%-p) -0.09 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
Cons. price inflation (%-p) 0.47 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
Unemployment rate (%-p) 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.21  0.21  0.21 
VAT revenue (% of GDP) 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25  0.25  0.26 
Transfers abroad  
(% of GDP) 
0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14  0.14  0.14 
 No 
direct competitiveness effects are likely as all goods and services are taxed in the same 
way (exports are not concerned). However, as GDP growth is affected, a medium-term 
effect on EU competitiveness could appear. 
Implementation Neither administrative nor compliance costs would increase. 
Legal aspects No specific legal difficulty. No change would be required in the VAT Directive. 
Equity All final consumers bear the burden of the VAT. Therefore the burden is higher in 
proportion for low income households who consume a higher share of their income. 
Some Member States apply zero VAT rate and will therefore contribute less than others. 
                                                 
40 The surcharge would not be applied to zero-rated goods. 
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3 cent surcharge on motor fuel excise duties 
Criteria Comments 
Revenue raising 
capacity 
€ 11-12 billion annually (including additional VAT revenues), taking into account the 
demand reaction due to the price increase. 
Data show that energy taxes revenues tend to be relatively stable, even in time of 
significant variations in oil prices. 
Economic aspects / 
Competitiveness 
The tax revenues raised would represent 0.1% of EU-25 GDP. 
The retail prices of transport fuels would increase 4% on average in EU- 25. This would 
lead to a 0.5% decrease in fuel consumption (TREMOVE model simulation). Since the 
increase in fuel prices is small, competitiveness impacts would be minor. For hauliers, as 
fuel prices only constitute a fraction of total transport costs (23%), the 4% increase in fuel 
prices would lead to a 0.9% increase in total transport costs. This would have only a 
limited impact on transport activities. However, if, for competitiveness reasons, it were 
envisaged to exclude professional diesel from the tax increase, revenue loss would 
amount to around one billion euros per annum. 
An incremental risk of fuel tourism may exist on the EU external border. 
In line with the decrease in fuel consumption, CO2 emission would fall by 0.5% and 
NOx and PM emissions approximately by 0.4% (TREMOVE model simulation). 
Implementation Present national rates on motor fuels would be increased by 3 cent per litre. Progressive 
increases (1 cent per year) could be contemplated.  
A harmonised energy tax structure is already in force in the EU (Directive 2003/96/EC). 
Administrative and compliance costs would remain at present level. No significant 
increase in fraud levels has to be feared. 
Fuel taxes and infrastructure charges could be compatible. 
Legal aspects No specific legal difficulty. No change would be required in the Energy Tax Directive. 
Equity The burden of motor fuel tax falls more heavily on the people using frequently private 
cars and living in the remote areas without public transport. The car ownership increases 
with a person's income level and hence the cost increase would be more important for 
higher than lower income households (although the cost increase would represent a 
smaller fraction of the household budget for higher than lower income households). As a 
whole, these effects are small. 
 
